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{1} The World Wide Web has experienced rapid growth during the 1990s, with millions of publishers adding
diverse opinions, objectives and page content. The main programming feature that has kept this network of
networks from becoming a twisted thicket of web-sites is the hyperlink. These links guide users across the
Web by creating connections from page to page and site to site, allowing a reader to follow tangential paths to
whatever it is the Web has to offer her. Links provide connections within a site and are also used constantly to
travel from one publisher's site to another. Because the linking system does not require action or permission
by the publisher of the link's destination site, that publisher often does not know that a link to his site has
been created.
{2} The diversity of the Web's publications and the easy connections that links offer have created a forum for
the free exchange of ideas unlike anything that has come before. This free exchange of information has
created a robust marketplace of ideas, but businesses whose sites include trademarks or other valuable
content can find their intellectual property interests threatened by unwanted links. For these publishers, the
First Amendment interests of free discussion and open debate are quickly eclipsed by their concerns of
trademark violations or misappropriation of their site's content. The ease and low cost of Web publishing has
also led to the proliferation of noncommercial publishers, who are outside the scope of the federal trademark
statutes and common law misappropriation claims, since the application of these laws are limited to the
conduct of commercial entities.[1]
{3} Congress and some state legislatures have tried to write Net-specific laws to solve the legal challenges
provided by the Internet, but these efforts have consistently met untimely ends in the courts. [2] Failed
attempts to govern the Internet through these specific laws suggest that the answer to the precedential
challenges posed by the Internet is not the creation of a new body of Internet statutes, but rather the careful
application of existing law. In the context of Web links, the tension between the First Amendment interests
served by linking and the intellectual property interests on the Web can be resolved by careful application of
existing law. Beyond that protection, it must remain up to each publisher to either prevent or tolerate
unwanted links. 
  
  
I. Introduction
{4} The number of sites on the World Wide Web has increased very rapidly in recent years. Though a
definitive count of the number of sites currently operated on the Web would probably be impossible, one
survey estimates 43,230,000 Web hosts as of January 1999.[3] Businesses and private citizens have charged
onto the Internet, hoping to take full advantage of the fledgling medium.[4] Pope, politician and pornographer
alike are represented online by sites designed to get their messages to the Web-browsing public.[5]
{5} One of the central features of the Web that has contributed to this growth is the ease of navigation
provided by hyperlinks, which consist of graphic images or highlighted words in the text of Web documents.
[6] By simply selecting a link with his mouse, the Web user is transported to the corresponding place on the
Web, whether that is within the site where the link appears or on another site altogether. This linking feature
gives Web users the ability to follow their interests easily and quickly from one document to another,
shopping the Web's immense marketplace of ideas.[7] This marketplace has turned the Web into a medium
which fosters the free exchange of ideas like no other medium before it. In addition, the ease and low cost of
global publishing on the Internet allow freedom of speech and of the press to an extent that far outstrips
traditional broadcast and print media. In traditional media, content is controlled by a much more limited
number of publishers, owners, and editors, all of whom are motivated by the mass market. On the other hand,
the Web is comprised of publishers with every conceivable message and motivation, and it is primarily the
linking function that allows ready navigation through all of the messages on the Web. As users follow links,
they are able to compare the viewpoints of diverse publishers who are only tangentially connected to each
other, each participating in this dynamic marketplace of ideas.
{6} When combined with the aggressive strategies of some Web publishers, however, linking has turned Web
presence into a mixed blessing for some 'netizens'. As a result of hyperlinks, many publishers have found
protecting their intellectual property on the Web to be a challenge. Linking one Web page to another without
permission can lead to legitimate claims of trademark dilution and tarnishment, as well as the common law
commercial tort of misappropriation.[8] American courts have not yet had a chance to shape the law in this
area, as the two major disputes of this kind have settled before trial.[9] The parties in a case from Great
Britain settled a similar case while final judgment was pending.[10]
{7} Some commentators have advocated the creation of a separate "law of the Internet" as a solution to the
problems encountered in trying to apply existing law to legal disputes arising in this wildly different context.
[11] This new set of laws is neither necessary nor possible to create. Those that act on the Internet should not
be allowed or required to opt out of existing law that governs communications and transactions in the rest of
the world simply because they choose to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the medium. The
answer, rather, is to devise principled approaches for the application of existing law to commerce and other
conduct in cyberspace.
{8} Existing trademark law can be readily applied to relationships between commercial Internet publishers.
However, the ease and low cost of publishing on the World Wide Web has brought to the medium many
noncommercial publishers, and therefore many links, to which trademark law does not apply as well. For the
sake of those publishers and the continued free exchange of information that the Web's linking function
serves so well, new lines must be drawn between linking practices which violate intellectual property law and
those which will have to be either prevented (without the help of the courts) or simply endured by the
commercial publishers who have chosen to join the throngs in cyberspace.
II. First Amendment
{9} The whole of the Internet fosters freedom of speech and of the press by providing a worldwide network
for instantaneous communication and publication, and the linking function itself serves the interest of the free
exchange of information, enabling users of the World Wide Web to navigate its diverse and dynamic
marketplace of ideas. The reasons for the First Amendment's protection of free expression are largely based
on the ideas that free and open debate will generate truth, and that only an informed electorate can create an
effective democracy. Thomas Jefferson wrote repeatedly on this topic:
{10} In every country where man is free to think and to speak, differences of opinion will arise from
difference of perception, and the imperfection of reason; but these differences when permitted, as in this
happy country, to purify themselves by free discussion, are but as passing clouds overspreading our land
transiently and leaving our horizon more bright and serene.[12]
{11} Jefferson also stated that: "Nothing but good can result from an exchange of information and opinions
between those whose circumstances and morals admit no doubt of the integrity of their views."[13] Other
noted political philosophers have thrown their weight behind the "marketplace of ideas" concept as well,
including John Stuart Mill. He conceived of the marketplace as a necessary means of testing the validity of
ideas: "[N]o one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon
him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him
in carrying on an active controversy with opponents."[14]
{12} The broad range of topics addressed by the far-flung and unfiltered publishers on the World Wide Web
doubtless include many topics Jefferson and Mill never imagined, and the value of which being highly
questionable in the context of public policy decision-making. Nevertheless, as government has reached out to
regulate more types of conduct, the types of discussion that are relevant to inform the electorate as to the
activities and makeup of their government have also expanded greatly. For example, by criminalizing the
importation and interstate transportation of "obscene" and "indecent" materials, [15] Congress creates a valid
argument for the value of the discussion of the definitions of "obscene" and "indecent."
{13} In his article, Free Speech is an Absolute, Alexander Meiklejohn argues that, "Self-government can
exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the
general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."[16] He goes on to argue that many
forms of expression lead to the type of "knowledge, intelligence, [and] sensitivity to human values" voters
need to inform their decisions.[17] Among these forms of expression, Meiklejohn lists education, philosophy
and the sciences, literature and the arts, and public discussion of public issues.[18] Casting the protective net
this broadly, it is hard to imagine a subject of discourse, and specifically of Web publishing, the free exchange
of which does not require First Amendment protection.[19] The enormous number of sites and publishers on
the World Wide Web has created a robust marketplace of ideas that is best (and most often) navigated by the
use of hyperlinks. This speaks loudly in favor of some degree of First Amendment protection for links
themselves.
{14} A case from the Northern District of Georgia suggests that First Amendment protection should be
extended to hyperlinks.[20]The Miller opinion came in a case challenging a Georgia law which sought to
restrict, inter alia, the use of trademarks and trade names on computer networks. The law made it a crime to:
knowingly . . . transmit any data through a computer network . . . if such data uses any . . . trade
name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol . . . which would
falsely state or imply that such person . . . has permission or is legally authorized to use [it] for
such purpose when such permission or authorization has not been obtained.[21]
{15} Such restrictions would severely limit links to commercial sites, since Web publishers would be loathe
to explain to judges, who may or may not be familiar with the ways of the Web, exactly what a link does or
does not imply about the relationship between the two publishers.
{16} Recognizing the law's chilling effect, the Miller court enjoined its enforcement,[22] noting that
Congress and the Georgia legislature had "acknowledged the First Amendment problems with banning
noncommercial use of trademarks"[23] by restricting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act[24] and the
Georgia trademark infringement law[25] to commercial use.[26]The court held that the statute was
"particularly harmful because it chills protected expression"[27] and therefore "operates unconstitutionally
for a substantial category of the speakers it covers."[28]
{17} The Miller court implicitly recognized the right of noncommercial Web publishers to link to the Web
sites of others, in the interest of the robust exchange of information which takes place on the Web.[29] The
court also noted that a segment of publishers apparently covered by the law - those engaged in educational
speech, news or commentary - must be able to freely use trade names and logos in the online world.[30]
{18} Commercial providers of news and commentary occupy a middle ground in the field of trademark and
copyright. As favored First Amendment entities, they enjoy a large measure of freedom in their use of names
and marks to refer to the subjects of their reporting,[31] but as commercial actors, they are subject to the law
of misappropriation and trademark infringement when the plaintiff is a competitor in the news and
commentary business.[32]The Georgia statute at issue in Miller is illustrative of clumsy legislative attempts
to alter existing legal doctrine for use in the online world. The Miller court made its skepticism of such law-
making explicit: "If [this] act prevents some ill-defined category of fraud or deception not covered by existing
laws, defendants do not articulate why they have a compelling interest in preventing that conduct on the
[I]nternet but have done nothing to prevent the same practices in the print media."[33] Other examples of
failed cyber-legislation include a New York law and Congress' first attempt to restrict indecent materials in
cyberspace.
{19} A federal district court in New York enjoined enforcement of section 235.21(3) of New York Penal Law,
which sought to punish, by one to four years imprisonment, anyone using a computer to convey harmful
sexual materials to minors.[34] In defining what would be considered harmful to minors, the New York Law
followed the holding of Miller v. California, where the Supreme Court adopted a three-part definition of
obscenity not deserving of First Amendment protection.[35] The district court held that the state law
necessarily reached beyond its borders in a way that violated the Commerce Clause.[36] The court rested its
opinion on the Commerce Clause violation, leaving aside the First Amendment issues in deference to the
Supreme Court's pending decision in Reno v. ACLU.[37]
{20} The federal statute at issue in Reno is another example of ham-fisted legislation born out of the notion
that the Internet's youth and rapid expansion requires the drafting of laws dedicated to its content.[38] The
Communications Decency Act met the same fate as the New York law when the Supreme Court enjoined its
enforcement due to Constitutional violations.[39] The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs' First
Amendment challenge, holding that "the CDA … threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet
community"[40] with its overbroad restrictions on what the Court calls "[t]he dramatic expansion of this new
marketplace of ideas."[41]
III. Trademark
{21} Legislatures need not try to reinvent the wheel in the trademark/hyperlink context, because the existing
law of trademarks and unfair competition is fit for application to the new medium as long as the conduct in
question involves the commercial use of trademarks. Trademark law protects a business mark only to the
extent that it identifies a source of goods or services, and therefore operates to prevent consumer confusion
about the source of goods or services as well as to preserve the mark owner's investment in customer
goodwill and business reputation. Commercial use of trademarks is defined in the federal Trademark Act,
"Lanham Act," as use in commerce to reference goods or services for sale.[42] Because enforcement of the
Lanham Act is limited by the bounds of the Commerce Clause, the Act's reference to use "in commerce"
brings with it the luggage of that separate jurisprudence. Under the commerce clause cases, "commerce" is
defined broadly, and an action will be found to be noncommercial where it is altogether non-economic and
where it will have no substantial impact on interstate commerce if the action is repeated elsewhere.[43]
{22} In its second attempt to regulate the content of the Internet, Congress takes another tack at defining
"commercial" in the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA" or "CDAII") as it seeks to divide users of the
Internet into those that are "commercial" and those that are not.[44] The distinguishing part of Congress'
definition characterizes commercial actors on the Web as those "with the objective of earning a profit as a
result of such [electronic communication] activities.[45] This "profit" distinction would seem to distinguish
the Web publications of non-profit charitable, advocacy, educational and religious organizations from those
entities subject to the law's content regulation.[46] This is true even though many such organizations seek to
generate funds through their Web sites.[47]
{23} Congress' definition of "commercial" in COPA is at odds with the meaning of "commerce" as it is used
in the trademark statutes, where the word is used as a reference to the activity Congress can regulate under its
commerce power. Where the COPA definition of what constitutes commerce is determined by profit motive,
the Lanham Act instead focuses on the enforcement limits set by the commerce clause on Congress'
trademark legislation. Between these two treatments, the Lanham Act's concept of "commerce" will be
adopted for the purposes of this discussion. The issue here is, after all, the extent to which Web publishers
can rely on traditional trademark claims to protect their intellectual property from unwanted links. Therefore,
even though the COPA division of Web publications into commercial and noncommercial communications is
conveniently context-specific to this discussion, COPA is Congress' attempt to deal with the prohibition of
certain content where it may be accessed by children, and is therefore irrelevant to the intellectual property
law implications of Web links.
IV. Likely Intellectual Property Difficulties on the Web
{24} Several types of trademark and unfair competition claims are likely to recur in link litigation. These
include misappropriation, trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and tarnishment.
{25} The common law tort of misappropriation occurs where one commercial actor free rides on the labors of
another, adopting a product for its own use without permission. The historic case on misappropriation is
International News Service v. Associated Press, where the defendant intercepted plaintiff's news and
rebroadcast it over its own wire service.[48] The hyperlink litigation that best fits a misappropriation fact
pattern is the case of Washington Post Co. v. Total News, where the defendant linked to plaintiffs' news
content in such a way that defendant's content remained on the computer screen, "framing" the plaintiffs'
content.[49] The misappropriation claim applies only to commercial actions, just as do the statutory
trademark causes of action for infringement and dilution. This is true because common law or state law
causes of action that seek to extend intellectual property liability beyond the territory covered by applicable
federal statutes are preempted by those statutes.[50]
{26} Trademark infringement occurs when another entity uses the owner's mark or one that is similar in a
way that is likely to cause consumer confusion as to the actual source of goods or services.[51] A recent
example of such infringement on the Web is Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, where a
judge enjoined use of the domain names "www.playboyxxx.com" and "www.playmatealive.com" on
defendant's Web sites, finding such use to be an infringement of the plaintiff's marks.[52]
{27} Dilution of a trademark is the unauthorized use of the mark in any way that diminishes the mark's
capacity to denote a single source, whether or not the user is a competitor.[53] Consumer confusion about the
source of goods or services is not an aspect of this violation.[54] In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., for
example, the court held that an advertisement making fun of the plaintiff's famous mark reached beyond the
permissible realm of comparative advertising and diluted the selling power of the mark.[55]
{28} One type of dilution is tarnishment, where the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark attaches a negative
association to the mark.[56] Common defendants in tarnishment suits are those in the pornography business.
For example, the court in Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc. granted injunctive relief to the plaintiff
where the defendant included plaintiff's trademarks and advertising jingle with pictures of plaintiff's trade
characters engaged in sexual intercourse.[57]
V. Exemplary Disputes
{29} Recent linking disputes illustrate the tensions between the First Amendment and the free-wheeling,
link-loaded nature of the Web on one hand, and the struggle to secure trademark rights on this new medium
on the other. Each case involves linking practices beyond the ordinary, plain-text links which are common
practice on the Web. Plain-text links are the most prevalent way to link to another part of the Web. These
links are generally designated on the Web page by being underlined and in a different color text than the
words around them. Links can consist of the name of the other site's publisher, the site's Uniform Resource
Locator (URL; for example, "www.yahoo.com"), or any description of where the link leads.
{30} Any graphic image may also be used as a link. The sufficiency and prevalence of plain text linking
escaped the court in Miller, which implicitly recognized a First Amendment right to link in spite of its
erroneous assertion that the use of trademarks, seals, logos, or symbols are themselves necessary "just for the
purpose of enabling the linking system."[58] This factual misstep is significant because a relationship is more
likely to be assumed where the link uses the destination site's recognized logo (which is usually protected at
trademark law) rather than a plain-text link.
A. Deep Linking
{31} Perhaps the most celebrated linking controversy is that of Ticketmaster v. Microsoft, involving
Microsoft's "Seattle Sidewalk" site.[59] Seattle Sidewalk is a service of Microsoft that includes local
telephone listings, a shopping guide, plenty of revenue-generating advertising, and an entertainment guide.
[60] To help its viewers buy tickets for events listed in the entertainment guide, the programmers of Sidewalk
linked directly to the corresponding events within Ticketmaster's Website, where tickets can be purchased
online. Sidewalk's links bypassed Ticketmaster's home page, entering the site behind Ticketmaster's own
event calendars, advertising, and statements about preferred payment methods.[61]
{32} Ticketmaster objected to these "deep links," and sued, alleging misappropriation, trademark dilution,
and unfair competition.[62] Ticketmaster claimed that Microsoft's unauthorized links diminished the value of
its advertising and linking agreements with other companies, and complained that Microsoft's deep linking
practice bypassed advertising on the Ticketmaster site.[63]
{33} This dispute settled before trial, and Microsoft removed the deep links to Ticketmaster's events listings,
replacing them with a page of information about buying tickets through Ticketmaster, which includes
Ticketmaster's phone number and a plain-text link to "Ticketmaster's external Web site at
www.ticketmaster.com."[64] From its end, for several months Ticketmaster disabled even this plain-text,
clearly unaffiliated link to its homepage, routing it to a page that read, "This is an unauthorized link and a
dead end for Sidewalk."[65] This dead-end page then directs the reader to the same (www.ticketmaster.com)
homepage.
{34} Another deep linking case arose in Great Britain, between competing newspapers in the Shetland
islands of Scotland.[66] The Shetland News and the Shetland Times each maintained a Web version as well
as a print version of their newspapers.[67] In addition to its own stories on the Web, the Shetland News
linked to its competitors' stories by use of deep links using verbatim headlines from the Times.[68] The
Times successfully obtained an injunction against this type of linking, but no final opinion was issued
because the parties settled before final judgment.[69] The settlement allows continued linking by the News,
but limits the links to the Times' headline page, and requires thorough notation on the News links that the
links lead to Shetland Times stories.[70]
B. Framing
{35} Another linking practice that has led to litigation is called "framing," and happens when a destination
site's (or 'linkee's') content is opened within a border maintained by the site doing the linking (or 'linkor'). The
URL displayed by the browser does not change, and the linkee's content is diminished in size, which can
cause the linkee's advertising to be obscured or miniaturized. Often the linkor will maintain its own paid
advertising and site menu on one or several sides of the linkee's content. This practice is problematic for
trademark reasons because of the suggestion of a relationship between the two publishers when one appears
as a subset of the other. Framers are also susceptible to misappropriation and unfair competition claims, as
the practice uses the content generated by the efforts and at the expense of the linkee publisher to the
advantage of the framer, without license, payment, or permission.
{36} The most significant framing battle to date, Washington Post Co. v. Total News, was settled before trial.
[71] Total News operates a Web site that serves as a directory of Web news services including the plaintiffs
Washington Post, Entertainment Weekly, Cable News Network, Los Angeles Times, Dow Jones and Reuters.
[72] Total News does not create any news content of its own, but instead maintains links to news providers
from its homepage and through a subject matter index.[73] The linking itself did not set the litigation in
motion, rather it was the way in which Total News linked to the plaintiffs' content to which they objected.[74]
When the Web user selected a news source from the Total News menu, that content would be displayed
within a Total News frame, on a smaller scale and with the Total News menu and advertising still visible
around the linkee's news copy.[75] The Web user's browser still indicated the URL, or current "Web address",
as that of Total News.[76]
{37} The Total News plaintiffs complained that this practice implied a non-existent affiliation, endorsement,
or sponsorship agreement with Total News, created consumer confusion, and diluted plaintiffs' trademarks.
[77] The settlement agreement allows Total News to continue linking to the plaintiffs' sites, but only by the
use of plain text links with no frames.[78] The order also makes the use of any link by Total News revocable
by any plaintiff.[79] The settlement terms in this case demonstrate that linking itself is not necessarily a
concern among commercial publishers. Instead, linking seems to be an accepted part of life on the Web, and
may even be appreciated by the linkee as a means of directing more traffic to its site. Instead, it is the "linking
plus" behavior of framing or the misleading use of logos which frustrates the linkee's intellectual property
and competitive interests.
{38} Of the six plaintiffs, only one, CNN, remains on Total News' homepage main menu bar.[80] USA
Today, Fox News, ABC News, and Yahoo! news, who were not plaintiffs in the suit, have apparently engaged
in self-help to combat the framing practice. Currently their sites are programmed to defeat the Total News
frame by "kicking out" of it, with some taking the extra step of beginning a separate browser window when
readers arrive from a Total News link.[81] One notable exception to this is MSNBC, which appears on the
main menu of Total News, and is still framed when linked to from Total News.[82]
{39} Litigation is ongoing in another framing case, that of Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc.
[83] Futuredontics is an online dental referral service, which licensed one of its service marks from Applied
Anagramics.[84] Anagramics linked its Web site to that of Futuredontics, placing its frame around
Futuredontics pages.[85] Futuredontics sued, claiming copyright infringement and unfair competition.[86] So
far, Futuredontics has withstood a motion to dismiss, but has failed to get a preliminary injunction against
Anagramics' linking practices.[87] Anagramics has both stopped framing and stopped linking to
Futuredontics' Web pages.[88] 
  
  
VI. Proposed Rules
{40} The above cases involve relationships between commercial Web publishers, but the low cost and the
ease of Web publication has led to many sites which are operated for personal or non-profit reasons.[89]
{41} It is simple enough to apply the existing intellectual property law of trademark disputes or unfair
competition to interactions between commercial entities on the Web. These principles, however, become less
clear when they are applied to interactions involving noncommercial entities. Trademark statutes and
common law unfair competition doctrine apply to commercial use of a mark.[90] Providers of news and
commentary, now prevalent on the World Wide Web, are given special leeway when it comes to trademark
dilution claims, even though they are commercialpublishers.[91]
{42} Because links are so important to the navigation of the Web, link limitations that ignore the
commercial/noncommercial distinction for the sake of protecting intellectual property interests on the Web
tread on First Amendment interests in the free exchange of information. In Reno v. ACLU and ACLU v.
Miller, such proscriptions were rejected as unconstitutional.[92] In Reno, the Court distinguished the
Communications Decency Act from earlier laws it had upheld against First Amendment challenges, in part
because the Act failed to make the distinction between commercial and noncommercial.[93] Previously, the
Court upheld a New York statute that prohibited selling obscene materials to minors, and it defended this
decision in Reno on the ground that the law applied only to commercial transactions.[94] The district court in
Miller made essentially the same observation, stating that one of its reasons for enjoining enforcement of the
Georgia statute was that it prohibited "the use of trade names or logos in non-commercial educational speech,
news, and commentary - a prohibition with well-recognized first amendment problems."[95]
{43} In order to steer clear of such First Amendment problems, careful application of existing rules is
necessary in the world of Web linking, because not all Web links operate in the same ways or for the same
reasons. Web links can be divided into two categories: 1) those involved in "commerce," and subject to the
laws of trademark and unfair competition; and, 2) those not involved in commerce, including the links of
noncommercial entities and links from commercial providers of news and commentary to non-competitors.
{44} The appropriate analogies for noncommercial links are footnotes or cross-references, because of the
absence of competitive or commercial motivations and the intent to simply provide more information and
access to more speakers on a given topic. The permissibility of footnotes and their inability to infringe on
intellectual property interests is well established in the copyright context, and the same logic applies to any
misappropriation or trademark claims that might arise in the noncommercial links context. West Group, the
legal publishing giant, has unsuccessfully challenged citation of its materials, including citation by other
commercial entities.[96] In a 1997 case, West Group was denied copyright protection from citations and from
wholesale reproduction of the cases in its reporters by a CD-ROM publisher.[97] West Group's results
suggest that courts are hesitant to offer the protection of intellectual property law to publishers whose work is
cited, and in some cases even reproduced, if such citation may be considered "fair use" of the material and
does not otherwise violate copyright law.
{45} In Sony v. Universal City Studios, the Court found that noncommercial and educational uses of
copyrighted works are favored in findings of fair use as a defense to infringement actions.[98] The Court
elaborated somewhat on this finding and the commercial/noncommercial distinction in fair use of copyrighted
materials in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.[99] In Harper & Row, the Court explained that the force
behind this distinction is the fear of free riding, or as the Court put it, "whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price."[100] This is the same
motivation that drives the federal trademark statutes as well as the common law of misappropriation.
Although Sony and Harper & Row exist in the separate context of copyright, the Court's holdings there lend
peripheral support to the permissibility of links by noncommercial or educational Web publishers.
{46} A presumption of a First Amendment right to link is appropriate for noncommercial links. The rules of
trademark and unfair competition cannot be applied to these links, and absent such trademark restrictions,
noncommercial entities' right to link can not be categorically limited in any principled way.[101] In order for
a misappropriation claim to lie, the challenged link needs to be both commercial and more than a plain-text
link.[102] For example, the pre-litigation deep links to Ticketmaster by Microsoft would rise to the level of
link activity actionable in a misappropriation claim; whereas, the link from Microsoft that Ticketmaster is
currently blocking would not rise to this level.[103]
{47} The question then becomes which publishers should be considered noncommercial in the context of
Web publishing, therefore enjoying this presumptive right to link. In order to draw a line here, it is necessary
to consider the purpose and function of the site where the link appears. Basic considerations are whether the
site is one that offers goods or services for sale, advertises goods or services for sale elsewhere, or profits by
advertising on its site. Inclusion of one or more of these three factors leads to the conclusion that the site is a
commercial one. The absence of these three factors leads to the presumption that the link is a noncommercial
one.[104] To add clarity to this dichotomy, it is necessary to examine the various intellectual property causes
of action in order to determine how existing intellectual property laws ought to be applied to Web links in the
contexts of misappropriation, dilution, and infringement.
A. Misappropriation
{48} As discussed above, the tort of misappropriation occurs where one commercial actor adopts a product
for its own use without authorization, thereby free riding on the labors of the creator. As we have seen in the
Total News and Ticketmaster cases, this tort is of real concern in the linking context, particularly where the
practices of deep linking and framing are used.
{49} However, not all links are equal in this regard, and the misappropriation claim must remain sensitive to
context. The parties to the Total News and Ticketmaster cases were all commercial actors, either publishing
information for advertising profits or selling services on the Web. The Web's many noncommercial publishers
are distinct from these. Because actions under the federal trademark statutes are limited to acts in a
commercial context, common law actions for misappropriation must also be so limited.[105]
{50} Applying this commercial/noncommercial distinction, noncommercial publishers should be entitled to
link in any way they choose without liability for misappropriation (obviously, linking that is defamatory,
fraudulent, or otherwise independently actionable would still be liable conduct). Commercial linkers on the
other hand, in order to avoid liability for misappropriation, should limit their links to plain-text links to other
publishers' home pages.
B. Dilution
{51} The dilution cause of action, including its tarnishment subset, is rooted in the Lanham Act. The statute
limits claims to cases where unauthorized use has caused "dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."
[106] Any unauthorized use that puts the mark into the public eye may reduce the distinctiveness of the mark,
eroding the close link to a particular product that is the mark's value and its purpose for the owner and to the
consuming public. Dilution is distinct from trademark infringement, because consumer confusion as to the
source of goods or services is not an element of the violation.[107]
{52} As applied to Web links, an example of dilution would be links consisting of car names leading to the
sale of different modems. The car names would be set up to represent the relative speeds of the modems. For
example, "the Volvo of the Internet," refers to a modem that is not the fastest but is very reliable, or "the
Ferrari Testarossa of Cyberspace," provides a link to the speediest modem the seller offers. Using the
goodwill built up by the cars' reputations as a shorthand method for selling modems is dilution. On the other
hand, if the car links are used in connection with consumer information, educational materials about cars, or
opinions about the cars or about the modems, this activity is excepted from the dilution statute by § 1125 (c)
(4)(B) and (C). The statute states that "noncommercial use of a mark" and "all forms of news reporting and
news commentary" are not actionable as dilution.[108]
{53} The same commercial/noncommercial distinction necessary in the misappropriation context is also
necessary here. Moreover, the resulting link rule is similar: the noncommercial use of a mark is justified when
constructing Web links, but commercial use is still dilution. The dilution statute applies only to the extent that
it would in other, more traditional, contexts.
C. Infringement
{54} The federal trademark infringement statute makes clear that a Web link infringes trademarks if it
misrepresents the source of any goods or services by using another entity's mark.[109] For example, if a
page's text link refers to "Microsoft products," but the link is to a list of the site publisher's own software for
sale, infringement has taken place and the customer is likely to buy the infringer's software thinking it is
buying a Microsoft product. It is clear from this example that the federal infringement statute applies just as
well online as off. This activity directed toward buying and selling is commerce by any definition.
{55} The conduct proscribed by the infringement statute is limited to commercial acts, making its application
in the realm of Web linking non-problematic in terms of potential application to noncommercial conduct or
First Amendment tensions. The statute controls only the use of a mark "in connection with any goods or
services . . . in commerce."[110] Any link using a mark simply to refer to another publisher's offerings of
ideas, a link that only furthers the free exchange of information without seeking to participate in "E-
commerce," simply does not trigger the infringement statute. If the "goods or services" for which the source
is misrepresented by a link are less concrete than in the above software example - if it is information offered
for free on the Web by a for-profit company - linking to that information does not in itself implicate the "in
commerce" requirement of the infringement statute.[111] If such a link is actionable at all, it is on a
misappropriation claim where the link is installed by another commercial publisher and the context of the link
suggests that the information is produced by the publisher creating the link.
VII. Safe Linking
{56} For commercial linkors wanting to keep their sites well-connected, but avoiding suits by linkees,
permission to install a link is the best practice. Where this is not practical or desirable, use of plain-text links
instead of logos and symbols of the linkee will be less objectionable to the mark's owner. Also, the
designation of these links as "external links," or "unaffiliated sites" will prevent confusion as to affiliation or
endorsement of other sites.
{57} A good example of this is Cable News Network's Web news publication, which makes a common
practice of this type of contextual insulation. The publication notes in a separate box below its news stories
that its links are to "Related sites," and that "External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive."[112]
Disclaimers or site design practices that prevent confusion as to the source of the material at the end of the
link will go a long way toward preventing claims of infringement or misappropriation. However, as
trademark dilution does not depend on confusion of sources, care must still be taken by publishers as to how
they use marks they do not own.[113] Further, as demonstrated by the Ticketmaster and Shetland Times link
litigation, where the link begins and ends with commercial entities, links to homepages are not as
troublesome as those to internal pages.[114]
VIII. Self Help
{58} The very nature of the Internet is such that a publisher's presence exposes it to links from other
publishers, even where links are not desired or invited. It is simply the nature of the beast; it is what makes
the Web the Web. Therefore, Web publishers will have to endure linking by news media, commentators, and
commercial entities; the courts will not step in absent something more than linking by itself.
{59} A lack of remedies in the courtroom is not the same as a lack of remedies for Web publishers, however,
and several options are available as means of protecting Web sites from the unwanted links of others. One
example is the link-blocking activity Ticketmaster uses to simply route the unwanted link to a dead end page
and instruct the would-be site visitor from there.
{60}Web publishers can defeat unwanted frames by including simple programming code that opens a site in a
new browser window when the site is accessed by any external link. Deep links can be defeated by rerouting
all external links to a publisher's homepage or by using a program that changes the URLs of a site's internal
pages at certain intervals so that external links are unable to find the internal pages.
{61}If a self-help suggestion seems like a suggestion that the legal system abdicate its responsibility to
govern on the online frontier, note that intellectual property remedies as a whole operate on a self-help basis.
[115] In the area of trademark rights, for example, failure to defend one's own rights results in an
abandonment of one's mark to the public domain.[116]
{62} The words "aspirin," "cellophane," and "thermos," for example, began as trademarks but were absorbed
into the English language with proprietary rights for none when the owners did not protect their interests in
these marks.[117]
{63} The trademark statute forbidding infringement and dilution uses injunctions as its enforcement
mechanism against use or liability in a "civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act."[118] Enforcement of trademark and misappropriation claims on the World Wide
Web presents no compelling reason to introduce government enforcement where self-help and private
litigation has always been the enforcement mechanism.[119] 
  
  
IX. Conclusion
{64} It must remain up to the mark owner to protect its trademark and other intellectual property interests on
the Internet, just as it would in any other business activity. The courts should not hear commercial entities'
complaints about the free-linking Web climate in the absence of some other activity that violates established
intellectual property law. These publishers must have known when they stepped into cyberspace that
hyperlinks are an integral part of the medium. The failed attempts of state and federal legislators to restrict
the free flow of ideas (from even unsympathetic Web publishers[120] and the hostility of some courts
regarding the creation of apparently redundant laws for the sake of the Internet [121] suggest that commercial
Web publishers are left with existing law and their own enforcement efforts to protect their intellectual
property on the Web.
{65} This is as it should be. The redundant networks of the Internet, originally engineered so that the network
might withstand a nuclear war, have made its rapid growth possible. The Web's structure allows for host
computers to participate from almost every nation on the globe,[122] and this flexibility contributes to its
content diversity and to access for all kinds of publishers. While useful to the structure of the medium, this
redundancy is unnecessary and unhelpful within the statutes of the United States.
{66} The Internet and the World Wide Web are certainly different from any other communications media.
Some have even suggested that cyberspace should operate as its own jurisdiction with its own laws.[123]
While the novelty and the expansive nature of the Internet provide a challenge to the application of many
existing laws, it is merely another communications medium. All of its users exist in real time and space, and
even though their actions play out on this disembodied global network, their actions are no less subject to the
laws of their physical jurisdictions (nation and state) because they are communicating through a medium on
which traditional notions of geography do not apply.
{67} As this discussion suggests, new law is not the solution to the difficulties the Internet causes in the
application of existing law. The solution is the principled application of existing law by the parties, the
attorneys, and the courts. In the context of hyperlinks on the World Wide Web, the solution to application of
trademark and misappropriation doctrine is the principled division of the actors into categories relative to
existing law. Once this is done, it is up to Web publishers themselves to engage in creative self-help to protect
their intellectual property where the courts cannot.
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